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Nature of Small Enterprise Development 
Political Aims and Socio-economic Reality 
Nasir Tyabji 
This political aim of the Government of India's small industries policy—the creation of a class of small capitalist 
entrepreneurs—required two measures to ensure its fulfilment. 
Firstly, the demarcating line between small and big capital had to be defined in a way that was both ad-
ministratively easy to handle and captured in an acceptable manner the essential difference between 'small' and 
'large' across a wide range of industries. 
Secondly, ways had to be devised to ensure against the entry of ineligible persons or conglomerates to the special 
provisions of the the development schemes. 
This paper assesses the success of the Government's efforts in these directions. 
I 
Introduction 
ON the basis of the policy analysis in an 
earlier paper had reached the conclusion that 
the two aims (basically inter-related) of the 
Indian Small Industries Policy were to 
develop the home market, through the expan-
sion in breadth and depth, of capitalism in in-
dustry; and the creation of a class of small 
capitalist or proto-capitalist entrepreneurs.1 
In the earlier paper, we had concentrated 
on the measures developed by the Govern-
ment of India to encourage the emergence of 
capitalist relations of production in the rural 
areas in general, and in the designated 
backward areas in particular. It seemed to us 
that this was justified in that the major 
economic aim of the small industries policy 
was expressed in these measures. However, 
the more clearly political aim—the creation 
of a class of small capitalist entrepreneurs, 
who would broaden the political and social 
basis of support to the government—would 
inevitably be the subject of more organised 
subversion from established industrial in-
terests. It is necessary, therefore, that some 
of the concrete issues faced by policy makers 
be discussed, and a broad assessment be 
made of their success in this venture, i e, pro-
grammes for the development of 'inde-
pendent' capitalist entrepreneurs. 
Essentially the point is the following. In 
our view, although a capitalist state does 
represent certain economic interests, this 
must not be interpreted in a mechanical man-
ner. Thus, in the Indian context, policy 
makers had not only to face opposition from 
the Gandhians, who disagreed with the 
capitalist strategy of development, but also 
from the large industrial interests who saw 
their short or even medium term interests at-
tacked by the State's policy of encouraging 
the rise of new capitalist interests. 
It will be recalled that the Gandhian op-
position had been neutralised by the Con-
stitution of the Khadi and Village Industries 
Commission. This institution, delinked from 
the normal administrative structure, had 
solved the problem of reconciling the Gan-
dhian's view of industrial extension work, 
with the imperatives of the capitalist develop-
ment strategy. This action, of delinking ex-
tension and promotion effort for modern, 
capitalist or proto-capitalist, enterprises from 
that for the rural and urban traditional crafts-
man had effectively reduced the latter 
measures to social welfare, -easing the in-
evitable decline of the bulk of such producers 
to paupers. It had also allowed for an ap-
proach most clearly implied, if not stated, in 
the perspective for the textile industry. 
Restated, this lay in the assumption that if the 
small capitalist enterprises could be protected 
from competition of the large integrated tex-
tile mills, this stratum would either absorb, or 
destroy, the precapitalist textile producers. In 
both cases, the objective of accelerating the 
differentiation of the producer the growth of 
capitalism, and of the home market would be 
achieved. 
In the case of the textile industry, it was 
relatively easy to demarcate the small 
capitalist enterprise from the large factory. In 
an industry where the machinery took the 
form of the hand-or the power operated 
loom, it was possible to demarcate the small 
unit from the large, quite simply, in terms of 
the number of looms employed. However, 
the extension of the principle of a demar-
cating line dividing small capital units from 
the large, to a very wide range of industries 
was quite another matter. 
This was so for two reasons. Firstly, there 
was the administrative problem of working 
out a demarcating line which would capture 
the essence of the difference between the 
"small' and the "large" across a wide range 
of industries. It was considered necessary to 
have a simple demarcating line so that the 
lower levels of the administrative agencies 
were not overtaxed by the complexities of 
the criterion. On the other hand, differences 
in technology, and in rates of technical 
change could be expected to affect the opera-
tion of the principles of economics of scale, 
and thereby the size of the optimum produc-
tion unit. Thus while administrative re-
quirements demanded simplicity, economic 
and technological considerations required a 
sophisticated approach. 
In addition to these problems, arising from 
the essentially arbitrary nature of any general 
criterion applied to any specific industry, lay 
the crucial issue of defending the small in-
dustries development programme from 
wholesale encroachment by large industrial 
interests. In the sections that follow, we ex-
amine the problems of definition, and later, 
the politically more intractable ones of 'gate 
keeping'. 
II 
Definitional Changes 
We had described in an earlier paper how 
the small scale sector came to be defined in 
terms of an unregulated sector, free from the 
provisions of the Industrial Development and 
Regulation Act.2 This had excluded units 
employing less than 50 workers with power, 
and 100 workers without power, from its pur-
view. To this criterion was added the further 
proviso that the fixed capital investment 
should not exceed Rupees five lakhs.3 The 
reason for this limit appears to be that under 
the Capital Issues (continuance of control) 
Act of 1947, capital issues of less than Rs 5 
lakh were exempt from control, and it was 
felt that the small scale sector should not be 
bound by this Act, either. 
Although, by this method, a small firm or 
enterprise had been defined, the problem 
with a definition of this kind is that it is con-
tinually the target of pressure for change. For 
example, an official committee reporting in 
1972 had this to say: 
There has been, of late, a persistent de-
mand for upward revision of the capital 
limit... the argument advanced in support 
of this upward revision is that the cost of 
machinery has gone up... Further it would 
not be possible for small enterprises that 
were started 5 to 10 years ago to moder-
nise their production machinery by 
replacing obsolete machinery unless they 
cross the investment limit fixed for small 
enterprise.4 
It was clearly the owners of the larger 
amongst the small scale units which would 
use their influence for an upward revision of 
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the criterion, and this fact was well recognis-
ed by the same Committee; 
It may be pointed out that out of 2.81 
lakh registered small scale units only 
about 1500 small scale units may be on the 
verge of crossing the investment limit of 
Rs. 7.5 lakh. It is the 'larger' among small 
units that have been able to absorb the 
maximum share of developmental assistance 
provided by the government for the growth 
of the small scale sector as a whole.5 
The pressures for upward revisions increas-
ed as the development programmes con-
solidated, and the criterion was applied more 
strictly. Initially the defining characteristics 
were to be used in a 'flexible manner'. Upto 
the last quarter of the Second Five Year Plan 
period, for instance, it was not clear whether 
the value of fixed assets was to be the gross 
value, or the depreciated book value. In 1960, 
the Estimates Committee suggested that the 
gross value should be used. This was accepted 
by the Government of India, and from the 
financial year 1960-61, the value of 
machinery was taken to be the original price 
paid by the owner, irrespective of whether it 
was new or second hand.6 
By 1959, already, there was some evidence 
that the definition of small scale unit was be-
ing consolidated by reference to various 
aspects of legislation. In that year, the 
employment criterion was relaxed to include 
units which employed less than 50 workers 
with power or 100 units without power per 
shift. Although the connection is difficult to 
establish directly, it is perhaps of significance 
that in 1957, the income tax laws had been 
modified to allow for a higher rate of 
depreciation allowance for multishift opera-
tion. This was at the rate of a 50 per cent in-
crease for two shift operation, and 100 per 
cent increase for three shift working.7 Clearly 
there would now be advantages in both re-
maining a small scale unit and undertaking 
multiple shift operations. 
A year later, in 1960, the employment 
criterion was removed altogether, and the 
small scale unit was defined as one in which 
the gross value of fixed assets was less than 
Rs 5 lakh. In addition, small scale ancillary 
units with investment upto Rs 10 lakh were 
permissible, initially in eight selected in-
dustries.8 Further changes in the definition 
took place in 1966, 1975 and, most recently, 
in 1980. In 1966, the limit of investment was 
raised to Rs 7.5 lakh, now to include the 
value of plant and machinery only.9 In 1975, 
three years after a strong expression of views 
by an official committee we have already' 
cited, the limit of investment in plan and 
machinery was raised to Rs 10 lakh and Rs 
15 lakh for 'normal' and ancillary units 
respectively.10 Finally, in 1980, the limit was 
raised to Rs 20 lakh, and Rs 25 lakh, respec-
tively.11 
A view that the small scale sector should be 
defined by units with a fixed capital invest-
ment of 'not more than Rs one or one and a 
half lakh' had been expressed in evidence to 
the Estimates Committee in early 1960, The 
concept of the "tiny" unit with fixed capital 
investment restricted to Rs 1 lakh fixed 
capital investment per worker to Rs 4,000, 
and the annual turn over to Rs 5 lakh per an-
num was suggested by an official committee 
in 1972. In 1977, based on the understanding 
that over ninety per cent of the existing small 
scale units had an investment in plant and 
machinery of less than Rs 1 takh, a 'tiny' sec-
tor which included units with less than this 
value in plant and machinery, and located in 
towns with less than a population of 50,000 
(according to the 1971 Census) was created.12 
The political support provided by the Janata 
party government's interest in rural decen-
tralised economic activity probably provided 
the impetus for this step. However, by 1980, 
the limit was raised to Rs 2 lakh.13 
The case for the increase in the investment 
limit has, of course, been based on the con-
tinuously rising prices of plant and 
machinery.14 If we take the definition of 
small scale unit to circumscribe the units to 
whom official policy support measures are 
applicable, then the rationality of the 
liberalisation must, in terms of our analysis, 
be measured against the objectives that we 
have outlined above. This was the protection 
of the small capitalist unit from the large, and 
encouragement of the growth of pre-and 
proto-capitalist units to small capitalist units. 
Analysis of the effects of changes in the 
definition of small scale units is, however, 
made difficult without a detailed analysis of 
price rises in a wide range of machinery occa-
sioned by the diverse technology involved. 
However, as a very broad guide, it may be 
mentioned that the official price index for 
non-electrical machinery with base year 
1970-71, stood at 175.2 in 1975-76, and 246.0 
in 1980-81. In addition, the problem is com-
pounded by the fact that with the liberalisa-
tion of the upper limit defining a small unit, 
different criteria were applicable to separate 
sections of development schemes. Thus, in 
1959, while the 'per shift' employment 
criterion was adopted. The National Small 
Industries Corporation continued to use the 
old criterion for the Government Stores Pur-
chase Scheme. Similarly, the interest rate on 
loans advanced under the State Aid to In-
dustries Act varied depending on the size of 
capital invested in the unit. In spile of the ef-
forts of a special committee to ensure that the 
criteria suggested by them should have over-
riding, statutory authority, the proposed 
legislation was not implemented.15 
The genuine administrative problems of an 
appropriate definition have been well ex-
pressed by a commentator who has held 
several positions enabling him to understand 
compulsions of official policy making: 
...any development policy for the small 
industry must ultimately help it to grow; 
such a policy should accelerate, not 
hinder growth... Hence a policy for small 
industries must be pragmatic and, in fact, 
encourage the small units to grow and 
become bigger units to whom assistance 
can be tapered off instead of being cut off 
sharply... To put it somewhat facetiously, 
the small industries development pro-
gramme is most successful when it make a 
unit large quickly so that the programme 
itself can help another unit.16 
Yet, a page later, he goes on to say: 
The definition of small industry varies 
from country to country: within the same 
country it changes periodically, which is a 
healthy symptom of growth... India in the 
course of the last 10 years has changed the 
definition almost three times—which is a 
good sign of the rapid growth of her small 
sector.17 
Apparently, there is a contradiction bet-
ween the former statement which implies that 
the defining characteristic of a small scale 
unit should remain constant vis-a-vis that 
unit; and the latter, which sees the liberalisa-
tion of the criteria in general as itself the sign 
of success of the policy. However, the author 
does hold the view that it is a sign of the 
sophistication of policy makers if they can 
devise steps by which individual units grow 
out of the fold of the small sector, thus mak-
ing way for other small units. The point he 
wishes to convey is probably that skill and 
pragmatism is required to achieve this goal. 
The problem has, of course, been made more 
complex by the policy of reserving items for 
production in the Small Scale Sector, and 
also for exclusive purchase by official stores 
purchase programmes. The policy of reserv-
ing items for production in the Small Scale 
Sector taken as a whole had begun with the 
reservation of dhotis and sarees of specific 
kinds for handloom units in the early nine-
teen fifties. In the case of those industry 
groups which lay within the purview of the 
Central Small Industries Organisation, reser-
vation had been made by 1967, for 46 items. 
By 1977, this had increased to 504 items. In 
1980, the number was apparently increased to 
a total of 807, but closer scrutiny shows that 
in the majority of cases, the existing items 
had been more carefully defined at the level 
of eight and nine digit national industrial 
classification codes. 
As far as the stores purchase reservation is 
concerned, the policy began in 1955. It was, 
in fact, the original rationale for the National 
Small Industries Corporation which was 
established as a result of the Ford Foundation 
Committee's Report. By 1980, there were 382 
items reserved. Proportional representation 
at the level of 75 per cent of purchases, and 
50 per cent of purchases existed for a further 
11 and 15 items respectively.18 
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It appears from a reading of official 
statements, such as the Ministers' statements 
to Parliament at the time of the 1977 and 
1980 Industrial Policy Resolutions, that the 
criteria for reservation is the technological 
capability of Small Scale units to produce 
these items. The government does not appear 
to be primarily concerned with the question 
of the efficiency of production at different 
scales. It would apper that even in the early 
1980s, this aspect of small industry promo-
tion is socially and politically oriented 
towards the encouragement of small units run 
on a capitalist basis. 
A natural concomitant of the concept of 
reservation has been the problem of dealing 
with units, manufacturing a reserved item, 
which are approaching the definitional ceil-
ing. Either such a unit must split if the firm is 
to continue expansion of production of the 
same item, or it must diversify into other 
items. Clearly policies emanating from a con-
sideration of these processes must have had 
their impact on the changes in the definition, 
though it is a complex task to trace the precise 
outlines of these "political" processes in 
specific cases. 
Somewhat at variance with the earlier ex-
pressed view in his assessment of the success 
of the policy in India, the Development Com-
missioner (Small Scale Industries) in 1975 
confirmed the view that a small number of 
units had monopolised the benefits of 
developmental aid: 
Dr Alexander felt there was immediate 
need for limiting the concessions and 
facilities for a period of 10 to 15 years 
would go [sic] a long way in breaking 
the trend of "once a small industry always 
a small industry". He deplored the 
tendency of some small scale units to re-
main small perpetually and said that if 
such industries had to remain small 
always on account of technological or 
economic reasons, they should, at least be 
prepared to be considered ineligible for 
some of the special concessions and 
facilities, after a particular period.9 
While the first set of quotations given 
above therefore deal with the principles of an 
effective small industries policy, the second 
brings out the problem of 'gate keeping' in an 
effective manner. Alexander appears to be 
referring to the problem of multiple owner-
ship of units, each individually within the 
small unit criterion. This point brings us to 
the politically substantive issue of the subver-
sion of the aims of the small industries policy. III 
Problems of Multiple Ownership 
With the decision of the Government of In-
dia to concentrate on the encouragement of 
the development of capitalist relations of pro' 
duction in the small scale sector, there arose 
inevitably the possible distinction between the 
small unit and the domestic household of 
small means. It is inherent in the pre-or 
proto-capitalist unit that the 'unit' is coter-
minus with such a household. As soon, 
however, as production activities are 
separated from domestic activities in the 
household, in other words as soon as wage 
labour replaces family labour, there is no 
organic reason for the identity of unit and 
household.20 Thus a single unit may be own-
ed by more than one household (though this 
would no longer represent a small capital by 
our criterion), or conversely an individual or 
group of individuals may own more than one 
unit.21 An external agency such as a capitalist 
state which might wish to ensure the identity 
of unit and household would, therefore, have 
to take upon itself the task of guarding 
against lapses. When put into words, this task 
shows immediately that it is one impossible to 
fulfill through any administrative body. 
Further, with the separation of unit and 
domestic household, there is no reason why 
the controlling interest need be domestic 
households at all. They can very well be 
organisations with large financial support, 
eager to utilise the benefits of the small in-
dustries development policy. To recapitulate, 
then, once the nexus between production unit 
and household labour is destroyed, there is 
no necessity for a one-to-one association bet-
ween a unit and household-based ownership 
and control. Not only, in these cases, need 
the individuals be, in the aggregate of the 
capital at their command, 'small persons'; in 
fact, large and medium capitals may also own 
or control what would otherwise be seen to be 
units representing small capitals. 
In our discussion of big business groups we 
had, in fact, pointed out that both the pro-
prietorship and the partnership could be a 
vehicle for big capitals operating in the form 
of industrial groups.22 In the reminder of this 
section, we shall consider the problem of 
multiple ownership, or of 'splitting'; in the 
next section the inroads of large financial in-
terests through the medium of the ancillary 
development programme will be discussed. 
The problem of multiple ownership seemed 
to be assuming major proportions by the time 
of the Fourth Five Year Plan. In fact, the 
Chairman, the Member-Secretary, and two 
other members of an 11 member committee, 
entrusted with the task of formulating legisla-
tion to support small unit development, had 
to write a minute of dissent on this issue.23 
They argued that the practice of splitting 
units so as to ensure that the Small Scale in-
vestment ceiling was not passed, could only 
be stopped by relating the capital investment 
in all units owned by a nuclear family to the 
defining capital investment criterion. It is 
significant that the two members of the Com-
mittee who agreed with the Chairman and 
Member-Secretary were both connected with 
small scale units. Furthermore, they 
represented private limited companies 
(medium big capitals by our criterion) which 
made their support for the 'ownership' 
criterion even more significant, for it would 
presumably be this stratum which could be 
expected to be in favour of 'splitting'.24 
It may be added that the majority of the 
committee, who did not sign the minute of 
dissent were either civil servants or profes-
sionals, in most cases not directly concerned 
with the small industries development pro-
gramme. Perhaps for this reason, they re-
jected the contentions of the minority on the 
grounds of the infeasibility of monitoring an 
ownership based criterion of small units. 
In the absence of any method of determin-
ing the extent of control across multiple small 
units on a reliable enough basis, it is difficult 
to gauge the extent of the phenomenon. 
However, regular advertisements in the press 
purportedly in honour of the father figure 
for, and owner of, a group of apparently 
small units provides impressionistic evidence 
for a relatively widespread occurrances of 
this phenomenon. These advertisements 
usually appear on an 'auspicious' day for 
the original promoter or his heir. We have 
confirmed in a few cases, where the names of 
the firms are provided that some of the firms 
are registered small scale units.25 
IV 
Problem of 'Gate Keeping' 
While the big capitalist class might as a 
whole have been prepared for a distinction 
between big and small to be made in the tex-
tile industry, the extension of this concept to 
other industries would be clearly unaccep-
table. As we had pointed out the advantage 
of political independence lay for them 
precisely in the opportunities opened for 
them for profitable new investment.26 State 
policy implicit in the Second Five Year Plan 
Strategy, which required the consumer goods 
sector to lie within the purview of the new 
small capitalist class, and the public sector 
to have almost a monopoly of the capital 
goods sector, required them either to remain 
where they were in terms of industrial assets, 
or to subvert the strategy, by making inroads 
into the sphere either of the public sector or 
of the small scale sector. The Report of the 
Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Commit-
tee has shown that they did both.27 Often the 
most profitable part of the large scale pro-
duction cycle was licensed to the Private Sec-
tor; their inroads into the Small Scale Sector 
is directly the subject of this section. 
The inroads were made both through the 
ancillary development programme and the 
regular small industries development 
schemes. It is important to remember in this 
context that, at least in the early stages of the 
programme, the Government of India ap-
peared to have conflicting opinions on the 
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role of large capitalist interests in the Small 
Scale Sector. Thus, notwithstanding the 
Planning Commission's Strategy for the Se-
cond Five Year Plan, the Minister for Con-
sumer Industry had made it clear in an article 
in The Statesman, that the Small Scale Sector 
was not closed to large industrialists.28 In 
fact, he chided their apparent reluctance to 
enter this field, and pointed out that in the 
then current debate on the roles of the public 
and private sectors, the point that the Small 
Scale Sector lay squarely in the latter should 
be remembered. It is therefore not very clear 
whether this was merely to deflect the opposi-
tion of the big industrialists to the Second 
Five Year Plan Strategy, then particularly 
vocal, as is apparent from the Minister's style 
of expression. It may be that the ancillary 
development programme arose as a way out 
of the conflict between the state's expressed 
desire to encourage small scale units, and the 
opposition of the established industrialists to 
measures, especially industrial licensing, bar-
ring them from easy expansion. We shall con-
sider the general problem of 'gate keeping' 
first, and then conclude with a discussion of 
the ancillary programme. 
It seems that administrative measures had 
been taken by the time of the Fourth Five 
Year Plan to exclude large units from the 
Small Scale Sector development programmes. 
An official of the Small Scale Industries 
Development Organisation pointed out that 
the following kinds of units, even if they fell 
within the investment criterion defining a 
small unit, would not be eligible for the 
government's aid programmes: 
(a) If the unit is a subsidiary or an 
associate of a company which does not 
lie within the definition of a small 
scale unit. 
(b) When a sizeable portion of the capital 
invested in the unit is held by one or 
more firms that are not small scale 
units. 
(c) When the unit's financial statements 
reveal considerable interlocking of 
capital and loan funds between con-
cerns under the same management, 
and where the loans finance only these 
transactions, but not production. 
(d) When the unit is the recipient of ad-
vances guaranteed by big industrial 
units or persons of large means.29 
Again, after the definition of a small unit 
had been liberalised in the 1980 Industrial 
Policy Statement, a clarification was issued 
by the Ministry of Industry shortly after-
wards. This stated that under the Industrial 
Development and Regulation Act, Small 
Scale units falling within the enhanced limits 
would be exempt from licensing regulations 
as long as they were not "a subsidiary of or 
owned and controlled by any other undertak-
ing".30 
In spite of these measures, both official 
and unofficial commentators have little or no 
doubt that large capitalist interests have 
definitely taken advantage of the concessions 
given to small units. In 1975, the Develop-
ment Commissioner for Small Scale In-
dustries was forthright: 
Dr Alexander regretted that some people 
with adequate financial and other 
resources had started small industries and 
have also availed themselves of the 
various concessions and facilities under 
the small industries programme. Unfor-
tunately such malpractices could not en-
tirely be curbed by purely legal provi-
sions.31 
Academic commentators have, in the re-
cent past, agreed with these views.32 It should 
also be mentioned that in the course of its in-
vestigations, the Dutt Committee on In-
dustrial Licensing came across several cases 
of unincorporated units within the fold of 
even the biggest business houses.33 Although 
no financial data for such units is provided in 
the Report, these might well have been within 
the orbit of the small industries development 
programme.34 
The development of small scale units an-
cillary to large scale units has been a stated 
objective of the small industries policy, par-
ticularly emphasised from the time of the 
Third Five Year Plan.35 There seems, 
however, to have been little progress made, 
atleast as far as officially recognised activity 
in this area is concerned. Partly, this may be 
the result of the emphasis varying widely at 
different times. Thus while the Etimates 
Committee of the Second Lok Sabha, in its 
enquiries into the working of the Central 
Small Industries Organisation, nowhere men-
tions ancillaries, the Reports of the Third 
Lok Sabha Estimates Committee take up the 
ancillary development programme as a major 
item. But the time of the Fifth Lok Sabha, 
there is again no specific mention of the pro-
gramme, though it returns to the centre of at-
tention during the Seventh Lok Sabha.36 
The problem also lies in the fact that the 
'official' ancillary unit has a pronouncedly 
anti-big capital character: 
A unit having a capital investment not ex-
ceeding 10 lakh [in 1966] which pro-
duces parts, component, sub-assemblies 
and tooling for supply against known or 
anticipated demand, of one or more large 
units manufacturing assembling complete 
products and which is not a subsidiary to 
or controlled by any large units in regard 
to the negotiations of contracts for supply 
of its goods to any large unit. This shall 
not, however, preclude an agreement w ith 
a large unit giving it the first option to 
take the former's output.37 
An ancillary unit could be expected to ob-
tain firm orders only when it is conceived as a 
part of the overall production process at the 
time that the large scale investment decision is 
made. It is extremely unlikely, on the other 
hand, that at such a time the promoters of the 
large unit would promote the development of 
ancillary units which were neither subsidiaries 
nor controlled by it. 
In evidence to the Estimates Committee of 
the Seventh Lok Sabha, the Secretary to 
Government of India, Ministry of Industrial 
Development stated: 
It is a fact that, though it cannot be quan-
tified the ancillary development pro-
gramme has not progressed to the extent 
we had hoped for due to structural fac-
tors.38 
What the structural factors could be was 
developed by the Secretary when he explained 
the implications of forcing unwanted sup-
pliers onto large scale units at the time of 
licensing a project: 
In terms of policy, it is a matter of very 
grave judgment whether or "not you are 
going to make investment in a large in-
dustry conditional on the ancillaries. I 
would say that this is a policy judgment of 
a very very grave magnitude and is of very 
serious implicatin that it will be [sic] 
impertinent on my part to submit to the 
Committee any view on this because this 
is a matter where unless the Government 
has taken a decision, I cannot express a 
view. There are many aspects to it. Apart 
from that we have to see the effect it may 
produce on investment itself.39 
The point appears to be that only in the 
case of prior existence of well established an-
cillary units with spare capacity might a large 
unit consider "buying out'' to be preferable 
to manufacturing the component in-house.40 
However, it seems that there is no require-
ment at the stage of granting a licence under 
the Industrial Development and Regulation 
Act, that the promoters consider the 
possibility of subcontracting. 
When specifically asked about the efforts 
made by government and the attitude of 
Government in the matter of ancillarisa-
tion, Secretary Industry stated that 
whenever a project was brought before 
the Ministry, the investment portion was 
scrutinised. However he clarified that an-
cillarisation had not been made a condi-
tion.41 
The Secretary emphasised that the question 
of ancillarisation was left entirely to the pro-
moter's appreciation of the situation. 
He added that the standard bought out 
items were procured by large establi-
shments as they could not afford to 
manufacture them in their factories. The 
specific components which were required 
by the large industries were allotted to the 
ancillary industries so that they could 
manufacture them.42 
With the apparent lack of official interest 
in developing ways of overcoming the 
obstacles to ancillary development, and the 
natural reluctance of big industrialists to en-
courage independent suppliers, it is not sur-
prising that the "official" programme should 
be seen to have failed. It is equally unsurpris-
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ing that there should be a feeling among a 
wide range of observers that the ancillary 
provisions have been used by big capital to 
develop captive units which hive been making 
use of the facilities extended by government to 
sub-contractors.43 These two apparently con-
tradictory facts may well represent little more 
than differrent perceptions. Official cognisance 
of the progress of the ancillary programme is 
presumably based on official statistics. A unit 
must register as an ancillary before it enters the 
domain of these statistics. On the part of the 
large unit, there is every reason, on the contrary, 
to avoid registration of a particular unit which 
is ancillary to it, for it would then lose the ad-
vantages of having a supplier which was, to 
official eyes, an independent small unit. Thus 
while the programme, intended to develop in-
dependent ancillary units, might be seen to 
have failed, large units may be having many 
ancillaries which are not registered as such. 
After an extensive survey of the literature 
on small scale enterprises in India published 
upto the end of the Third Five Year Plan, 
Douglas Fisher has the following to say: 
Since it cannot be established that the 
development of ancillaries would be vital 
to Indian progress, it must be presumed 
that such efforts are imposed on the 
economy in the nature of a constraint. In 
addition specific comments indicate that 
results in other countries (for example, 
Japan), where ancillaries are important, 
are cited as suggesting an emphasis... in 
India. The irrelevance of the arguments is 
overwhelming as is often the case when 
one attempts to justify a constraint. There 
are, of course, econonmic arguments in 
favour of ancillaries: that they are, for in-
stance' more efficient due to lower 
overhead costs or that they help eliminate 
the wastes of competition... and that they 
improve the quality of research and of the 
product itself. It is evident that these are 
spurious arguments for no evidence on 
their behalf is given in these respects; fur-
thermore, it must be established in this 
connection that all of these ends will be 
better served by ancillaries than by com-
plete large units as well as independent 
small units.44 
Our impression is that Fisher is correct in 
identifying the ancillary development pro-
gramme as. a response to a constraint. This 
was the need, in our view, on the one hand to 
develop markets for increasing numbers of 
small scale units, once the gap created by the 
import restrictions of late nineteen fifties had 
been filled. On the other hand, there was 
possibly even stronger compulsion to allow 
big capital to expand through the develop-
ment of ancillaries captive to their large 
units.45 This compulsion would have been the 
greatest during the period of the Second Five 
Year Plan when for all the lapses, the licens-
ing system was operated in a far tighter way 
than in later periods.46 
V 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have argued that the 
political aim of the small industries policy — 
the creation of a class of small capitalist 
entrepreneurs—required two measures to en-
sure its fulfillment. Firstly, the demarcating 
line between small and big capital had to be 
defined in way that was both administratively 
easy to handle, and which captured in an ac-
ceptable manner, the essential difference bet-
ween 'small' and 'large' across a wide range 
of industries. Secondly, ways had to be devis-
ed to ensure against the entry of ineligible 
persons or conglomerates to the special provi-
sions of the development schemes. 
As far as the first measure is con-
cerned—that of an appropriate demarcating 
line—the Government of India took the ap-
proach of defining small enterprises in terms 
of the concept of the unregulated sector. 
Thus the original definition was bounded by 
the provisions of the industrial Development 
and Regulation Act, and apparently, by the 
Capital Control Act. However, once the 
definition had been in force for some time 
and had consolidated itself, it became the 
target of pressure for change. We have found 
that though there may be scientific reasons 
for the changes, in terms of the rising prices 
of plant and machinery, it is difficult to 
determine the validity of the changes. The 
reason for this is that different criteria have 
been applicable to various segments of the aid 
programme. 
Evaluating the validity of the definition has 
also been made a complex task by the ap-
parent confusion sourrounding official policy 
statements. As we have argued in an earlier 
paper, and in the present paper the aims of 
small industries policy were twofold; in such 
a case the problem of encouraging the 
development of small scale units and small 
scale persons through the same programme 
would require a certain looseness in the 
definition.47 In defence of the definitional 
changes it could be argued, for instance, that 
these changes were based on changes in con-
ception of the resources expected to be 
available to a small scale person at given 
points of time. 
It is, of course, difficult to determine the 
detailed considerations at work in the policy 
making process, in the absence of sufficient 
officials with personal acquaintance of the 
policy formulation process. The reason for 
this is that official documents, or even of-
ficial files, are unlikely to record fully the 
events which would enable a detailed 
understanding to be gained. 
What is relatively easier to document, for it 
is the subject of closer scrutiny, is the effec-
tiveness of the gate keeping procedures that 
have been developed. It appears that 
although some procedures were laid down to 
ensure that ineligible interests did not benefit 
from the assistance programmes, they were 
not applied, at least in the majority of cases. 
We have argued that this was inevitable. It 
would require investigative activities perhaps 
out of proportion to the severity of the lapse 
in each individual case to guard against gate 
crashing. The fact that in the aggregate, on 
the other hand, Japses have assumed propor-
tions so as to lead to questions about the very 
efficacy of the programmes, is a matter of 
some importance to political economy. 
Our impression is that effective measures 
against large scale gate crashing in this sphere 
are difficult to achieve in an economy 
characterised by large concentrations of in-
dustrial capital. It is for the same reason that 
we feel that the contradiction between official 
estimates of the success of the ancillaries 
development programme, and the general 
recognition of the existence of a large number 
of 'captive' ancillary units may be resolved. 
Large capitalist interests will choose, for ob-
vious reasons, to decline registering captive 
ancillaries as such. Officials, in the absence 
of legislative backing (which has itself been 
mooted some time ago) will be reluctant to 
probe beyond a point. Under these condi-
tions, while officially recognised progress 
based on official statistics may be slow, unof-
ficial evidence for large scale pre-emption of 
the ancillary market may mount. 
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